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在室内行人疏散过程中,行人博弈对疏散效率有着重要的影响.本文把抵制博弈策略更新的强度定义为抵制强度. 为了研究抵制强度对疏散效率的影响, 通过在行人博弈策略更新的概率中引入抵制强度,基于元胞自动机模型数值计算在不同的行人密度, 出口宽度下疏散总时间随抵制强度变化的关系.结果表明: 室内行人疏散过程中, 抵制强度小会使得争抢行为极其容易蔓延. 当行人密度小且出口宽大时, 输入以急速疏散为主的规范信息,鼓励行人模仿优胜者更新博弈策略, 当行人密度大且出口狭小时, 输入以避让为主的规范信息抑制行人争抢,都能提高疏散效率. 最后找出不同条件下与最短疏散总时间相对应的优化抵制强度, 为提高室内行人疏散效率提供一个新的视角.In the process of indoor pedestrian evacuation, the game between pedestrians greatly influence evacuation efficiency. In this paper, we introduce the boycott strength into the updated game strategy coefficient in order to investigate the influence of boycott strength on the evacuation efficiency. The relations between the evacuation time and boycott strength for different pedestrian densities and exit widths are obtained by numerical simulations based on cellular automaton model. The results show that the vying behaviors are extremely easy to spread and the crowd will turn into a vying state when the boycott strength is small. When the pedestrian density is low and the exit is wide, we encourage the pedestrians to imitate the winners to update their game strategies via offering the information about standardizing roles about rapid evacuation. When the pedestrian density is high and the exit is narrow, the information about standardizing roles about avoiding to congestion is provided. Thus, the evacuation efficiency can be enhanced. Finally, the optimal boycott strength corresponding to the shortest evacuation time in different conditions is yielded. Our study provides a new perspective to enhance the efficiency of indoor pedestrian evacuation.
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Keywords:
- cellular automaton/
- pedestrian flow/
- evacuation dynamics/
- game
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